Man-made threats to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-dependent infrastructures are constantly evolving as malicious actors strive to stay one step ahead of security safeguards. A GNSS receiver that satisfies a certain standard of resilience in 2023 may not be sufficient by the end of the decade if a brand-new or previously unknown type of interference emerges in the meantime. GNSS spoofing is a significant concern as it is an intentional form of interference that aims to deceive a receiver into accepting counterfeit signals as genuine. The technical challenges of spoofing GNSS receivers are higher compared to jamming, and the consequences can be more severe, as the receiver may use tampered signals for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), resulting in misleading position and time information. This paper analyzes the potential impact of spoofing on commercial- and mass-market-grade GNSS receivers. The impact analysis is also be supported by an in-house open-source software-defined research receiver named ‘FGI-GSRx’. Additionally, findings from the real-world spoofing test conducted during Jammer test campaign 2022 in Norway, are also be presented.

Jammertest 2022 was a week-long series of satellite navigation and timing signal jamming and spoofing exercises carried out on the Norwegian island of Andøya in September of 2022. Organized via a collaboration between the Norwegian spectrum management authority, defense research establishment, public roads administration, metrology service, and others, the result was the largest known GNSS jamming and spoofing event open to international collaboration and provided an open-access data and publication policy for participants. This paper reviews the event’s organization, scheduled tests, noteworthy jamming observations, noteworthy spoofing observations, and the unexpected observations found during the event and also presents information on what data are publicly available to interested parties, along with the contact information needed to obtain these data.

NovAtel has recently leveraged its expertise in both receiver design and anti-jam technology to develop solutions for space- and weight-constrained applications in challenged GNSS environments. Robust Dual-Antenna Receiver (RoDAR), is based on a commercial dual-antenna receiver, originally designed for attitude determination, and employs special firmware to mitigate jammers and spoofers without an increase in size or power consumption. With RoDAR, the multi-frequency, multi-constellation dual-antenna receiver is capable of null-steering at two different frequency bands (e.g., L1 and L5). In September 2022, the Norwegian Public Roads Administration hosted JammerTest, a live, over-the-air broadcast jamming and spoofing test. This paper presents the jamming and spoofing detection and mitigation performance of RoDAR during this live broadcast test. The interference detection provides spectrum monitoring and jamming characterization on all GNSS bands. The mitigation is carried out by steering a null formed on-board the receiver towards a jamming/spoofing source at GPS L1 and L5 bands. The null steering performance is characterized as a function of signal and position availability compared to a non-protected NovAtel receiver. The effectiveness of the anti-jam and anti-spoofing technology is demonstrated using representative complex spoofing and jamming test cases during this event.

The European Commission (EC) Joint Research Centre (JRC), in the frame of a scientific and technical support activity with the Satellite Navigation Unit of the EC Directorate General Defence Industry and Space (DEFIS) and the European Union Agency for the Space Programme (EUSPA), has agreed to facilitate testing and demonstrations activities of Research and Development (R&D) Actions under the European Union (EU) Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) Programmes. In this context, Horizon Europe and Galileo Fundamental Elements project consortia are invited to come to the JRC and access the GNSS testing facilities based in its Ispra Site. With the aim to promote this testing activities, a reference document providing an up-to-date inventory of the GNSS testing capabilities was published in July 2021 and now, with the present inventory, is updated and extended. From the first release of the inventory, the JRC keeps on improving its GNSS laboratory testing capabilities, addressing in the best manner the new challenges and evolving user needs in the GNSS domain, all with a clear focus on Galileo. Since the declaration of the initial services in 2016, Galileo has enriched its portfolio of services, introducing clear differentiators with respect to other GNSS systems. In particular, the Galileo Open Service (OS) has been upgraded with an improved navigation message, acting as a boost of the robustness and time to first fix, the High Accuracy Service (HAS) enables a decimetre-level accuracy through real-time corrections broadcast by Galileo satellites, the OS Navigation Message Authentication (OSNMA) strengthens the security and resilience against spoofing attacks, the Safety-of-Life (SoL) service enables the implementation of horizontal ARAIM service, responding the requirements of civil aviation. This report is structured as follows. Firstly, it sets the general terms and conditions to request the access to the testing facilities, and secondly, it provides a comprehensive summary of the GNSS testing capabilities that are currently available at the JRC. In many occasions, a reference to past testing campaigns is made to illustrate the typical testbeds and results that were produced. With this reference document at hand, interested project consortia should be able to specify an initial test plan with the required level of detail.

Man-made threats to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS)-dependent infrastructures are constantly evolving as malicious actors strive to stay one step ahead of security safeguards. A GNSS receiver that satisfies a certain standard of resilience in 2023 may not be sufficient by the end of the decade if a brand-new or previously unknown type of interference emerges in the meantime. GNSS spoofing is a significant concern as it is an intentional form of interference that aims to deceive a receiver into accepting counterfeit signals as genuine. The technical challenges of spoofing GNSS receivers are higher compared to jamming, and the consequences can be more severe, as the receiver may use tampered signals for Positioning, Navigation, and Timing (PNT), resulting in misleading position and time information. This paper analyzes the potential impact of spoofing on commercial- and mass-market-grade GNSS receivers. The impact analysis is also be supported by an in-house open-source software-defined research receiver named ‘FGI-GSRx’. Additionally, findings from the real-world spoofing test conducted during Jammer test campaign 2022 in Norway, are also be presented.

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